

## **Philosophy of Mind**

Professor: Reid Blackman

Email: rblackman@colgate.edu

Phone: 512-294-1515

Office hours, location: T 3:30-5:30, Hascall 204

### **Required Texts**

- Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Jackson and Braddon-Mitchell (“the green book”)
- Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Chalmers (ed.) (“the blue book”)

### **Part I: The Mind-Body Problem**

#### **Dualism**

- Descartes, “Meditations”, Blue Book 10-21.
- Huxley, “Animals are Automata”, Blue Book 24-30.
- “The Flight from Dualism”, Green Book 1-19 (skip after 19)

#### **Behaviorism**

- Ryle, “Descartes’ Myth”, Blue Book 32-39.
- Carnap, “Psychology in Physical Language”, Blue Book 39-45.
- Putnam, “Brains and Behavior”, Blue Book 45-55.
- “Behaviorism and Beyond”, Green Book 37-47.

#### **Identity Theory**

- Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, Blue Book 55-60.
- Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Blue Book 60-68
- Fiegl, “The Mental and the Physical”, Blue Book 68-73.
- Kripke, excerpt from *Naming and Necessity*, Blue Book 329-334.
- “The Identity Theory”, Green Book 95-100 (skip page 97, on Functionalism, which we are covering next)

#### **Functionalism**

- Putnam, “The Nature of Mental States”, Blue Book 73-79.
- Lewis, “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications”, Blue Book 88-94.
- “Common Sense Functionalism”, Green Book 48-64.
- “Four Challenges to Functionalism”, Green Book 107-114, and “The spectrum inversion objection to functionalism”, 131-134. (Summarizes and responds to Block and Searle’s objections to functionalism, which are next in the reading list, as well as the spectrum inversion argument against functionalism.)
- Block, “Troubles with Functionalism”, Blue Book 94-99.
- Lewis, “Mad Pain and Martian Pain”, to be supplied by me.
- “The Zombie Objection”, Green Book 123-125 (stopping at ‘empirical functionalism and zombies’)

## **Part II: Belief and Experience**

### **“Beliefs ain’t in the Head”**

- “Broad and Narrow content”, Green book 237-253. *Read only up to p. 253 and skip pp. 240-245 and starting read again at ‘the explanatory role of narrow content’*
- “Are Meanings in the Head?” Blue book, 584-587.
- “Anti-individualism and Privileged Access”, Blue book, 634-638
- “The Extended Mind”, Blue book 643-651.

### **Contemporary Physicalist Theories of Belief**

- “Language of thought”, Green book pp. 171-179
- “Content”, Green book 184-215 (i. e. only read up to “a general objection”)
- “A Recipe for Thought”, Blue book 491-500

### **Experience**

- “The Problem of Perception”, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/> You can skip section 3.2 on Adverbialism.
- “Visual Content and Visual Qualia”, Blue Book 447-457
- “Representationalism and Phenomenal Consciousness”, Green Book 149-153.

### **Experience ain’t in the Head**

- “The Problem of “Swampman Meets Inverted Earth”, Tye (to be supplied by me)
- “Representationalism Showdown”,  
<http://fragments.consc.net/djc/2005/09/representationa.html>